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INTERESTS OF AMICUS CURIAE1

Amici are leading organizations dedicated to helping those individuals facing
insurance denials and rejections due to pre-existing conditions, including
organizations dedicated to reducing the incidence of and the impact of major
diseases, disorders, and disabilities, and engaged in advocacy on behalf of
individuals affected with such conditions. Amici have amassed invaluable
knowledge of the impact of these conditions and of the history of remedies and
policies aimed at lessening these impacts. Amici represent the interests of
individuals who are at risk of serious financial and medical consequences, if they
cannot obtain insurance to cover the costs of their medical care. Such individuals
are thus tangibly and profoundly harmed by health insurers‘ practice of denying
coverage to persons with pre-existing medical conditions and other abuses that are
prohibited by the insurance reforms in the ACA, to which the minimum coverage
provision is integral and essential.2 Moreover, the barriers to affordable coverage

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(c)(5), counsel for amici
represent that no counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part and that
none of the parties or their counsel, nor any other person or entity other than amici,
its members or its counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the
preparation or submission of this brief. All parties have consented to the filing of
this amicus brief, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).
2
―Minimum coverage provision” is the phrase employed in this brief for the
statutory requirement to carry minimum levels of insurance or pay a penalty – what
is sometimes referred to as the ―individual mandate.‖
1

1
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eliminated by the ACA increase financial costs and compound medical threats for
the entire population, since lack of access to affordable health insurance impedes
timely diagnosis and treatment, postponing remedial action until remedies are both
more expensive and less effective. Hence, amici have both a strong interest in
preserving the insurance reforms in the ACA and the capacity to offer information
that illuminates the soundness of Congress‘ conclusion that the minimum coverage
provision is critical to the success of these vital reforms. All parties consented to
the filing of this brief.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because the district court correctly determined that it lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case, there is no need for this Court to reach the merits of
appellants‘ claims. Nevertheless, should this Court decide to reach the merits,
empirical evidence and analysis demonstrate that Congress correctly concluded
that a minimum coverage provision ―is essential to creating effective health
insurance markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed
issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.‖3 Patient

―Guaranteed issue‖ refers to requirements that insurers accept specified applicants
for coverage, e.g., small businesses applying for coverage. ―Exclusion of coverage
of pre-existing conditions‖ refers to the practice of denying coverage to persons
who have or have had illnesses or conditions that could require treatment during
the policy period. Kaiser Family Foundation, How Private Health Coverage
3
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Protection and Affordable Care Act (―ACA‖), Pub L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 §
1501(a)(2)(G) (2010). In particular, the evidence presented here shows that every
single state that required insurers to cover pre-existing conditions without also
enacting a minimum coverage provision had disastrous results.
Individuals who do not carry insurance are nonetheless participants in the
health care market and, collectively, shift billions of dollars of costs onto third
parties. Cong. Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing Major Health Proposals 114
(2008),

available

at

http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/99xx/doc9924/12-18-Key

Issues.pdf. The minimum coverage provision addresses this cost-shifting and forms
an essential part of the ACA‘s broader reforms. In particular, one of the most
problematic of the insurance industry practices targeted by the ACA – the
exclusion from coverage of persons with pre-existing medical conditions –
depends upon a minimum coverage provision.
ARGUMENT
I. THE EXPERIENCE OF THE STATES DEMONSTRATES THAT
ENSURING COVERAGE FOR PERSONS WITH PRE-EXISTING
MEDICAL CONDITIONS HAS WORKED ONLY WITH A
COMPLEMENTARY REQUIREMENT THAT PERSONS WHO CAN
AFFORD IT CARRY HEALTH INSURANCE

Works: A Primer, 2008 Update (April 2008), available at
http://www.kff.org/insurance/upload/7766.pdf.
3
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Congress‘ judgment that the minimum coverage provision is integral to
barring exclusions for pre-existing conditions and other insurance reforms was
based on considerable evidence demonstrating that, without such a requirement,
―many individuals will not choose to obtain coverage … [and] adverse selection
will occur . . . .‖ Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, Do Individual Mandates
Matter?, Urban Institute, Jan. 2008, available at http://www.urban.org/
uploadedpdf/411603_individual_mandates.pdf. "Adverse selection" occurs when
persons with a higher than average health risk disproportionately enroll in a given
insurance plan. Currently healthy consumers will tend to delay the purchase of
health insurance until they become ill or injured – forcing the insurer to pay them
substantially more in benefits than they have previously paid in premiums, and
increasing premiums for those who are insured. See Fed. Ins. Co. v. Raytheon Co.,
426 F.3d 491, 499 (1st Cir. 2005).
In hearings before Congress, testimony on behalf of the National
Association of Insurance Commissioners noted that due to the ―severe adverse
selection‖ resulting from the ―elimination of preexisting condition exclusions for
individuals, State regulators can support these reforms to the extent they are
coupled with an effective and enforceable individual purchase mandate and
appropriate income-sensitive subsidies to make coverage affordable.‖ Roundtable
Discussion on Expanding Health Care Coverage: Hearing Before the Senate
4
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Finance Committee, 111th Cong. 3 (2009) (statement of Sandy Praeger, Chair of
the Health Insurance and Managed Care Committee, National Association of
Insurance Commissioners). Indeed, ―[w]ithout the individual mandate,
fundamental insurance-market reform is impossible[.]‖ Jonathan Gruber, Getting
the Facts Straight on Health Care Reform, 361 New Eng. J. of Med. 2497, 2498
(2009), at http://healthcarereform.nejm.org/?p=2473.
But Congress‘ judgment was not merely supported by research and analysis.
The need to couple insurance reform with a minimum coverage provision had been
demonstrated by the actual experience of states which have tried to do otherwise
and – without exception – failed.

A. State Bans On Excluding From Coverage People With Pre-Existing
Conditions That Were Not Accompanied By A Minimum Coverage
Provision Have Been Unsuccessful
Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, and
Washington enacted legislation that required insurers to guarantee issue to all
consumers in the individual market4, but did not have a minimum coverage
provision. See Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304.17A-060(2)(A) (West)(Kentucky,
repealed); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. Tit. 24-A. § 2736-C(3) (Maine); N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 420-G:6 (1994)(New Hampshire); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 17B:27A-22

―Individual market‖ refers to the market for health insurance policies for
individuals not covered by employer-sponsored or other group health plans.
4
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(West)(New Jersey); NY CLS Ins § 3231, 3232 (New York); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 8, §
4080B(d)(1)(Vermont); Wash. Rev. Code § 48.43.012(1)(Washington). All of
these laws have had detrimental effects on the insurance markets in those states.
All seven states suffered from sky-rocketing insurance premium costs, reductions
in individuals with coverage, and reductions in insurance products and providers.
"The departure of nearly all insurers from Kentucky's individual market is
probably the most widely known aspect of its reforms." Adele M. Kirk, Riding the
Bull: Experience with Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and
Massachusetts, 25 J. Heath Politics, Pol'y & L. 133, 152 (2000) (―Riding the
Bull‖). By late 1996, only two providers were still selling new policies in
Kentucky's individual market, and the most commonly cited reason given by the
departing companies to explain their departure was the pre-existing conditions
provision. Id. at 152–53. Kentucky's reforms were eventually repealed in 1998. See
1998 Kentucky Laws Ch. 496 (H.B. 315).
Maine experienced a similar loss of insurance providers from its individual
market after its pre-existing conditions provision was enacted in 1993. A 2001
report found that 13 of 18 major carriers ceased issuing new policies to individuals
during the eight years since the provision became law. Maine Bureau of Insurance,
White Paper: Maine's Individual Health Insurance Market, January 22, 2001, at 8
(―White Paper‖). The report had equally grim news about costs. Many insurance
6
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providers doubled their premiums in just three years or less, and all but one of the
state's HMOs experienced "at least one rate increase of 25% or more in 1998 or
1999." Id. at 6, 7 & 10.
The same Maine report cited New Hampshire as a cautionary tale of a state
whose individual indemnity market completely collapsed. According to the report,
New Hampshire was nearly left with no carriers in the market
when Blue Cross Blue Shield of New Hampshire announced it
was withdrawing from the individual market. The New
Hampshire Insurance Department took emergency measures to
preserve the market. Under the system adopted through
emergency rulemaking, and later by statute, all group health
insurance and excess loss carriers in New Hampshire are
assessed an amount (36 cents monthly in 2000) per covered
person. Funds are distributed to individual carriers according to
a formula designed to compensate those with large losses.
Id. at 5. In 2003, New Hampshire amended its law to permit pre-existing
conditions to be excluded for 9 months. Act of May 19, 1997, ch. 188, sec. 11, §
420-G:7, I(a) (2003). After New Jersey's pre-existing conditions provision took
effect in 1993, individual insurance market premiums skyrocketed. Between 1996
and 2001, the cost of the most generous individual insurance plans rose by more
than 350 percent. Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and Sustainable
Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23.4 Health Affairs 167, 169–
70 (2004). Even HMO plans, which tend to resist premium increases, nearly
doubled in price during this same timeframe. Id.

7
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New York enacted pre-existing condition provisions for the individual
market in 1993. Consequently, the portion of non-elderly New Yorkers without
insurance worsened from 16.5 percent in 1992 to 20 percent in 1997; while during
the same period of time the national average of Americans without coverage
worsened from 17.8 percent to 18.4 percent. Mark A. Hall, An Evaluation of New
York's Reform Law, 25 J. Health Politics, Pol'y & L., 71, 76-77 (2000). A study of
the New York individual market concludes that "[f]ollowing reform, the overall
percentage of the population with insurance has worsened, and enrollment in the
individual market has steadily diminished. Prices have increased substantially
more than in other portions of the market, due to adverse selection." Id. at 97.
Like New York, Vermont saw substantial increases in premiums after its
similar insurance reform measures took effect in 1993. Mark A. Hall, An
Evaluation of Vermont‟s Reform Law, 25 J. Health Politics, Pol‘y & L. 101, 115
(2000).
Severe consequences resulted from Washington's law. Within just a few
years, non-managed care options disappeared entirely from the individual market.
Riding the Bull at 140; White Paper at 5. Among HMOs in the individual market,
―[t]he trend since 1994 has been toward higher deductible and/or more managed
products as insurers have progressively closed lower deductible, less tightly
managed products.‖ Riding the Bull at 140. The state‗s only insurer in the
8
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individual policy market stopped selling new individual policies. Id. By 2000,
some Washington counties had no private individual coverage available at all.
White Paper at 5. In 1999, the Washington state legislature modified its law to
permit insurers to deny coverage to certain high-risk consumers.5
Recent experience with the early implementation of ACA indicates similar
results in the national market when a pre-existing conditions provision is not
accompanied by a minimum coverage provision. In September 2010, a nationwide
pre-existing conditions provision for children went into effect under the ACA. Pub
L. No. 111-148 § 10103(e). Immediately thereafter, several large insurance
companies stopped offering new child-only insurance policies. A.C. Aizenman,
Major Health Insurers to Stop Offering New Child-Only Policies, Washington
Post, (Sept. 20, 2010). A health insurance industry spokesperson explained that
―[w]ith no … mandate currently in place, … the result over the next several years
[until 2014, when the minimum coverage provisions takes effect] could be that the
pool of children insured by child-only plans would rapidly skew toward those with
expensive medical bills, either bankrupting the plans or forcing insurers to make up
their losses by substantially increasing premiums for all customers." Id.
Some other aspects of Washington state‗s health reform have been successful.
Carol M. Ostrom, Washington „a Step Ahead‟ of Health Law, Seattle Times, Apr.
1, 2010, available at
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2011504803_statehealthreform02
m.html.
5

9
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Based on this experience of the states as well as the early implementation of
ACA, it is totally foreseeable that the pre-existing conditions exclusion will not
succeed without the minimum coverage provision. Thus, it is predicted that
premiums in 2019 are likely to rise 27% without the minimum coverage provision.
Jonathan Gruber, ―Health Care Reform is a ‗Three-Legged Stool,‘‖ (2010),
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/08/pdf/repealing_
reform.pdf. The Congressional Budget Office also estimates that, without the
minimum coverage provision, the number of newly insured individuals will be cut
in half. Congressional Budget Office, ―Effects of Eliminating the Individual
Mandate to Obtain Health Insurance‖ (2010).
An unbroken pattern shows that pre-existing conditions provisions, absent a
minimum coverage provision, are a failed experiment. At best, they result in
premium increases. At worst, they cause the total collapse of a state‘s individual
insurance market.
B.

Massachusetts Successfully Banned Excluding From Insurance Plans
Patients With Pre-existing Conditions By Requiring Minimum
Coverage

Where seven states failed, the state of Massachusetts succeeded by
implementing reforms similar to the ACA. See Jonathan Gruber, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, The Senate Bill Lowers Non-Group Premiums: Updated
for New CBO Estimates 1 (2009) (―Senate Bill Lowers‖). Indeed, Congress cited
10
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Massachusetts‗ health reform as a model for the ACA. Pub L. No. 111-148 §
10106(a).
In mid-2006, Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney signed a health reform
bill which included a minimum coverage provision. Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 111M,
§§ 1-5. Massachusetts law already had a pre-existing conditions provision. Mass.
Gen. Laws ch. 176M, § 3(a). The results were both striking and immediate.
Although nationwide individual premiums increased an average of 14 percent over
the next few years, ―the average individual premium in [Massachusetts] fell from
$8537 at the end of 2006 to $5143 in mid-2009, a 40% reduction while the rest of
the nation was seeing a 14% increase.‖ Senate Bill Lowers at 1 (emphasis in
original).
The lesson of Massachusetts and the other seven states is clear. A preexisting conditions provision must have an accompanying minimum coverage
provision to be successful. Because a minimum coverage provision is essential to
enacting the ACA‘s pre-existing conditions provision, it falls squarely within
Congress‘ authority under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses.
Congress does not simply have the power to regulate interstate commerce, ―‗it
possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.‘‖ Gonzales v.
Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 36, 125 S.Ct. 2195, 2217 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring in the

11
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judgment) (quoting United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118-19,
62 S Ct. 523, 526 (1942)).
The court in Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services., No.
3:10-cv-91, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8822 (N.D. Fl. Jan. 31, 2011) created an
additional limit on Congress‗ Necessary and Proper power—suggesting that
Congress may not invoke this power to ―avoid the negative consequences that will
potentially flow from its own statutory enactments.‖ Id. at 115. It is, of course,
incorrect to suggest that the ACA creates a negative consequence—rather, the
minimum coverage provision is an essential and integral component of the scheme
that Congress designed to achieve its legitimate objective of ending preexisting
conditions exclusions while preserving an affordable private individual insurance
market. Automobiles have engines and gas pedals so they can move – their
primary purpose – but they also have steering wheels and brakes so their motion
can be controlled; the ACA is no different. As demonstrated by academic studies
and the extensive experience of the states, combining mandatory coverage of preexisting conditions with a minimum coverage provision achieves Congress‘
objective without negative consequence.
Ultimately, however, it is irrelevant whether the minimum coverage
provision is merely directed at ―avoiding negative consequences‖ flowing from

12
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other provisions of law because Florida‘s entirely novel limit on the Necessary and
Proper power cannot be squared with precedent.
In United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Court held that,
when the federal government endangers the safety of a community by incarcerating
―sexually dangerous‖ inmates nearby, it may detain those inmates beyond the
length of their sentence in order to remove the danger created by such
incarceration. Id. at 1961; see Id. at 1968 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment)
(explaining that Congress may exercise its necessary and proper power to ensure
that another provision of law does ―not put in motion a particular force . . . that
endangers others‖). Just as Congress may legislate to ―avoid the negative
consequences‖ of the criminal law, it may also legislate to ensure that the
preexisting conditions provision does not spark an adverse selection spiral that
threatens the national health insurance market.
II. INDIVIDUALS WHO CHOOSE TO FOREGO INSURANCE
SHIFT BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF COSTS TO OTHER
PARTICIPANTS IN THE HEALTH INSURANCE AND SERVICES
MARKET
Uninsured individuals fall into three categories: some individuals cannot
afford insurance coverage, some are denied coverage because of pre-existing
conditions, and some choose to forego purchasing insurance in the hope that they
will never require expensive medical treatment or that if they do, it will be
13
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available in any event. Uninsured individuals seeking care for pre-existing
conditions or who have unexpected health care costs due to illness or injury can
lead to increased costs for other, insured Americans. This is because ―[t]hose who
are uninsured are less likely to get the care that they need when they need it and are
more likely to delay seeking care—often until a condition becomes so serious that
treatment can no longer be put off.‖ Christine Sebastian et al., Health Reform:
Help for Americans with Pre-Existing Conditions, Families USA, May 2010, at 9,
available

at

http://www.familiesusa.org/assets/pdfs/health-reform/pre-existing-

conditions.pdf (―Help for Americans‖); see also Committee on the Consequences
of Uninsurance, Institute of Medicine, Health Insurance is a Family Matter 106
(2002) ("Uninsured children often receive care late in the development of a health
problem or do not receive any care. As a result, they are at higher risk for
hospitalization for conditions amenable to timely outpatient care and for missed
diagnoses of serious and even life-threatening conditions.").
Under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. §
1395dd, however, a patient who allows his condition to deteriorate until it requires
expensive treatment to stabilize must still receive treatment from most emergencies
rooms even if he is unable to pay. Cong. Budget Office, Key Issues in Analyzing
Major Health Proposals 13 (2008). These high costs of stabilizing a dangerous
condition are then distributed to other consumers.
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According to a recent study, this ―hidden tax‖ on health insurance accounts
for roughly 8 percent of the average health insurance premium. Ben Furnas &
Peter Harbage, The Cost-shift from the Uninsured, Center for Am. Progress, March
24, 2009, available at http://www.americanprogressaction.org/issues/2009/03/
pdf/cost_shift.pdf. This cost-shift added, on average, $1,100 to each family
premium in 2009 and about $410 to an individual premium. In a high-cost state
such as Florida, the cost-shift is even greater, increasing annual average family
premiums by $1,400 and individual premiums by $510 per year. Id.
For those who can afford health insurance coverage, and choose not to
purchase care, the decision to remain uninsured is clearly an economic calculation
with adverse consequences for other market participants. Those who opt to selfinsure can virtually never guarantee that, when faced with a life-threatening illness
or traumatic injury, that they will bear all their health care costs or forego
necessary treatment. According to a recent study, the cost of active treatment for
prostate cancer had an average 2-year cost of $59,286. E.D.Crawford et al., A
Retrospective Analysis Illustrating the Substantial Clinical & Economic Burden of
Prostate Cancer, 13 Prostate Cancer & Prostatic Diseases 162 (2010). For
colorectal cancer patients, the cost of treatment can exceed hundreds of thousands
of dollars. The cost of drugs alone can range from $150,000 to $200,000 for a
course of treatment. Neal J. Meropol & Kevin A. Schulman, Kevin, A., Cost of
15
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Cancer Care: Issues and Implications, 25 J. Clinical Oncology 180 (2007),
available at http://dceg.cancer.gov/files/genomicscourse/meropol-011007.pdf. In
comparison, U.S. Census Bureau data shows, median household income for 2007
was $50,740, and median household net worth in 2007 was $120,300. U.S. Census
Bureau, 2010 Statistical Abstract: Income, Expenditures, Poverty & Wealth
(2009), available at http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/income_
expenditures_poverty_wealth.html.
By enhancing access to insurance, the pre-existing conditions provision
increases the likelihood that patients will seek treatment early, and thus will not
pass on elevated costs to other consumers.
III. THE MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION, TOGETHER WITH
THE PROHIBITION ON EXCLUSIONS FOR PRE-EXISTING
CONDITIONS, CAN BE EXPECTED TO REDUCE HEALTH CARE
COSTS, PREVENT MEDICAL BANKRUPTCIES, ENCOURAGE
FLUIDITY IN THE JOB MARKET, AND ELIMINATE THE
ECONOMIC COSTS FROM UNNECESSARY DEATHS
The harm from the exclusions for pre-existing conditions cuts across the entire
U.S. population. An estimated 57.2 million Americans under the age of 65 suffer
from a pre-existing condition. Help for Americans at 2. A congressional
investigation conducted after passage of the ACA found that the four largest U.S.
for-profit health insurers denied policies to one out of every seven applicants based
on their prior medical history. H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce Memorandum,
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111th Cong., Coverage Denials for Pre-Existing Conditions in the Individual
Health Insurance Market 1 (Oct. 12, 2010). Congress also found that pregnant
women, fathers-to-be and those attempting to adopt children are generally unable
to buy policies on the individual insurance market. Id.

A.

The Pre-existing Conditions Provision Will Reduce Health Care Costs
For Millions of Americans

Many of the 57.2 million Americans with pre-existing conditions currently
can be denied coverage outright, forcing them to pay even catastrophic medical
costs out-of-pocket. See Karen Pollitz et al., How Accessible is Individual Health
Insurance for Consumers in Less-Than-Perfect Health?, Kaiser Fam. Found., June
2001, at 31, available at http://www.kff.org/insurance/20010620a-index.cfm
(―How Accessible‖) (finding that insurers in the individual market consider certain
conditions to be ―uninsurable‖). Yet even very minor conditions can lead to denials
of coverage—one study found that individual insurers will deny coverage to a
young, otherwise-healthy woman 8 percent of the time simply because she suffers
from hay fever. Id. at 7. Likewise, temporary conditions such as pregnancy can be
grounds for complete denial of insurance, id. at 19 n.27, potentially imposing
enormous unanticipated costs on uninsured women, see Committee on
Understanding Premature Birth & Assuring Healthy Outcomes, Institute of
Medicine, Preterm Birth: Causes, Consequences, and Prevention 398 (2007)
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("Preterm Birth") (estimating the total costs of medical treatment for preterm births
alone to be $16.9 billion in 2005).
The weight of pre-existing condition exclusions falls particularly hard on
women. Women are more likely than men to suffer from chronic conditions. See
Alina Salganicoff et al., Women and Health Care: A National Profile, Kaiser Fam.
Found., Jul. 2005, at 8, available at http://www.kff.org/ womenshealth/7336.cfm.
Insurance companies have denied coverage to women based solely on their history
of having had a Cesarean section or required them to show proof of sterilization.
Denise Grady, After Caesareans, Some See Higher Insurance Cost, N.Y. Times,
June 1, 2008, at A26, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/01/health/01insure.html. Survivors of domestic
violence may also face pre-existing condition coverage denials, National Women‗s
Law Center, Nowhere to Turn: How the Individual Health Insurance Market Fails
Women 8 (2008), available at http://nwlc.org/reformmatters/NWLCReportNowhereToTurn-WEB.pdf.
About 13.5 million children have special health needs, Ha T. Tu & Peter J.
Cunningham, Public Coverage Provides Vital Safety Net for Children with Special
Health Care Needs, Center for Studying Health Sys. Change, Sept. 2005, at 1,
available at http://www.hschange.com/CONTENT/778/778.PDF. But pre-existing
conditions are most common among older Americans. Nearly half of all adults
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between the ages of 55 and 64 suffer from a pre-existing condition, and thus could
be denied insurance coverage absent the ACA‘s pre-existing conditions provision.
Help for Americans at 3.
Other individuals with pre-existing conditions will be issued insurance only
if they agree to pay increased premiums, accept a higher co-payment or deductible,
exclude their pre-existing condition from coverage, accept an annual or lifetime
cap on coverage, or all four. How Accessible at i–iii & 24. Insurers typically
substantially limit the benefits available to children with long-term health
conditions. Treatment such as rehabilitation services, for example, is "usually
limited to 3 months after an acute event that usually requires hospitalization."
Preterm Birth at 459.
For Americans denied meaningful access to health insurance, every illness is
a potential brush with economic ruin. The pre-existing conditions provision will
remove this risk, also removing a substantial burden to interstate commerce in the
process.
B.

The Pre-existing Conditions Provision Will Reduce Medical
Bankruptcies

At its core, health insurance exists to ―distribute[] risk‖ away from an
individual unfortunate enough to be struck with an expensive illness or injury and
spread these costs among a large pool of individuals. Group Life & Health Ins. Co.
v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 239, 99 S. Ct. 1067, 1087 (1979). Without access
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to insurance, persons with pre-existing conditions are constantly at risk of being
struck by an unaffordable hospital bill, forcing them to declare bankruptcy.
Likewise, Americans who can afford insurance but choose not to purchase it
impose significant burdens on interstate commerce when they subsequently declare
bankruptcy to escape from medical bills they cannot afford to pay.
Congress found that ―[h]alf of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part by
medical expenses,‖ Pub L. No. 111-148 § 1501(a)(2)(E). One study estimates that
―62.1% of all bankruptcies have a medical cause,‖ and the share of bankruptcies
attributable to such causes increased by 50 percent between 2001 and 2007. David
U. Himmelstein et al., Medical Bankruptcy in the United States, 2007: Results of a
National Study, 122 Am. J. of Med. 741, 742 (2007). The pre-existing conditions
provision will increase access to insurance, reducing the number of patients hit by
catastrophic bills and decreasing the substantial burden medical bankruptcies
impose on interstate commerce.
C. The Pre-existing Conditions Provision Will Reduce “Job Lock”
Because employer-provided health plan participants typically enjoy legal
protections against exclusion, see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1181, 1182, the only way for many
people with pre-existing conditions to secure coverage is to receive insurance
through an employer. See How Accessible at 19 n.27 (finding that insurers in the
individual market consider certain conditions to be ―uninsurable‖). Thus, absent
20
Appellate Case: 11-1973

Page: 29

Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3819950

the pre-existing conditions provision, thousands of American workers will forego a
job opportunity because of fear that they will be uninsured if they leave their
current job. This ―job lock‖ phenomenon ―accounts for a 25–30 percent reduction
in [job] mobility.‖ Brigitte C. Madrian, Health Insurance and Job Mobility: Is
There Evidence of Job-Lock?, 109 Q. J. of Econ. 27, 43 (1994); see also Kevin T.
Stroupe et al., Chronic Illness and Health Insurance Related-Job Lock, 20 J. Pol‗y
Analysis & Mgmt. 525, 525 (2001) (finding that workers with chronic illnesses or
a family member with chronic illness are 40 percent less likely to voluntarily leave
a job which provides health benefits than a similarly-situated healthy worker with a
healthy family). Moreover, Congress was well aware of job lock when it debated
the ACA. See Terminations of Individual Health Policies by Insurance Companies:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the House
Comm. On Oversight and Investigations, 111th Cong. (2009) (statement of
Jennifer Wittney Horton) (―I have had to take jobs that I do not want, and put my
22 career goals on hold to ensure that I can find health insurance.‖); President
Barack Obama, Address to a Joint Session of Congress (Sep. 9, 2009) (―More and
more Americans worry that if you . . . change your job, you'll lose your health
insurance too.‖).
Excluding individuals with pre-existing conditions from coverage stifles
entrepreneurship; it leads workers to choose large employers over promising young
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companies; it forces workers to limit their career path to jobs which offer health
benefits; and it discourages workers from going where their talents lead them. By
eliminating such exclusions in the individual market, the ACA will significantly
reduce—if not eliminate altogether—these substantial burdens to interstate
commerce.
D.

The Pre-existing Conditions Provision Will Reduce Preventable
Deaths

Finally, and most tragically, nearly 45,000 deaths every year are associated
with a lack of health insurance. Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and
Mortality in US Adults, 99 Am. J. Pub. Health 2289, 2295 (2009). Beyond the
terrible human tragedies of these deaths, this figure represents tens of thousands of
workers whose productive lives are cut short, often leaving their families without a
source of income. By increasing access to lifesaving health insurance, the preexisting conditions provision would prevent many of these tragic deaths, removing
a substantial burden on interstate commerce.
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CONCLUSION
Amici respectfully submit that the Court should AFFIRM the decision of the
district court dismissing the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Should the
Court reach the merits, however, amici submits that, for the foregoing reasons, the
ACA falls squarely within Congress‘ authority.
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